“Our only way to carry on the fight was by organised and bold guerilla warfare. But this in itself was not enough. England could always reinforce her army. To paralyse the British machine it was necessary to strike at individuals outside the ranks of the military. Without her Secret Service working at the top of its efficiency England was helpless; robbed of the network of this organisation throughout the country, it would be impossible to find ‘wanted’ men.” –Michael Collins
Britain had always been able to either place spies in rebel parties or else succeed in enticing Irishmen to ‘rat out’ their colleagues for money and protection. With his own intelligence network, Michael Collins took on, and beat, Britain at its own game.
“For the first time in the history of separatism we Irish had a better intelligence service than the British. This was Michael Collins’ great achievement and it is one for which every Irishman should honour his memory.” –Todd Anders
Michael Collins was appointed the Director of Intelligence of the Irish Volunteers in January 1919. By this time, he had already laid much of the groundwork for his intelligence network.
Collins had penetrated the Irish and English postal, telephone and telegraph systems. Letters and dispatches could be moved to various contacts by certain train inspectors. The railway workers were organised so effectively that the military frequently had to move troops and stores by road, which would play into the hands of the IRA ambushes as the war intensified. The trade unions were mobilised to hamper police and military movements by road, rail and sea. For many months the army had to tie up thousands of men on the major ports as the dockers had paralysed all attempts to land stores.
One of Collins’ key activities was gun running. He established a network of agents using his IRB connections. His secret channel was dubbed the ‘Irish Mail’. Gelignite from Wales and England came carefully packed in tin trucks, rifles came in wicker hampers, revolvers and ammunition in hand luggage. In December 1918 a munitions factory was set up in the cellar of a bicycle shop in Dublin, with Collins taking over the operation of it several months later.
The most important event in 1918 for the intelligence network was Collins’ meeting in March with Detective Ned Broy of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP). The police in Ireland was divided into the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) throughout the country and the DMP in Dublin city. Broy gave Collins a detailed, inside knowledge of the British police system in Ireland. He learned how the system worked and how the police were trained. Particular attention was paid to the special ‘G’ division of the DMP, whose job it was to keep watch on any national movements. Anyone suspected of being an agitator had an ‘S’ placed after their name and their movements were followed by the ‘G’ Men. Each ‘G’ man transferred his files every night to ‘a very large book’, of which Broy had access to. Collins was from then on able to get a copy of every secret file that went into the very large book. As well as Broy, Collins got in contact with two other detectives who were based in Dublin Castle.
Collins set up an intelligence office at 3 Crow Street over a print shop. Liam Tobin became the Chief Intelligence Officer. The office’s initial task was to gather as much information as possible about the DMP, especially ‘G’ division. Collins continued to recruit agents for his intelligence network. The chief clerkess at British military headquarters in Cork provided a vast amount of information on raids, spies and informers. A typist in Dublin Castle supplied information concerning field security and counter-insurgency operations, as well as personal details of British intelligence officers. On 7th April 1919, Detective Broy smuggled Collins into the Detective Headquarters in Brunswick Street, where he spent the entire night going through police records. Collins was the first Irish revolutionary to have the entire modus operandi of the British police in Ireland laid out before him.
On 9th April, a new and bloodier phase of the intelligence war began. Acting on Collins’ orders, a number of ‘G’ men were warned by the Volunteers against an excess of zeal. ‘G’ men who did not comply would pay with their lives.
“I am a builder, not a destroyer. I get rid of people only when they hinder my work.” –Michael Collins to Ned Broy
Collins set up ‘the Squad’, a small band of Dublin Volunteers attached to the Intelligence Department, in July 1919. It was a full-time assassination team, made up of clerks, tradesmen, and general workers, who were paid £4.10 a week. According to Bill Stapleton, one of its members: “Our chief function was the extermination of British spies and individuals.”
Strict rules were laid down for Squad shootings. Assassinations were a last resort, coming after repeated warnings to the target. Once the order to shoot was given, the Squad would study the locale carefully and work out where and when the shooting would take place. After a job the guns would be dropped in the pockets of ‘the Black Man’, a former boxer who perpetually walked the streets of Dublin.
On 30th July, Detective Sergeant Smith of the ‘G’ Division was shot dead by the Squad on the authority of Dáil Éireann. On 12th September, Sergeant Daniel Hoey was shot dead outside of Police Headquarters at Brunswick Street. Both Smith and Hoey had disregarded several warnings from Volunteers. As a result of these killings, political detectives became less inclined to go beyond the call of their duty, or taking any risks in its execution. Collins explained his strategy in 1922.
“Without her spies England was helpless. Spies are not so ready to step into the shoes of their departed confederates as are soldiers to fill up the front line in honourable battle. And, even when the new spy stepped into the shoes of the old one, he could not step into the old one’s knowledge. We struck at individuals, and by doing so we cut their lines of communication, and we shook their morale.”
The other main result of these killings, and Volunteer activity in Munster, was the banning of Sinn Féin and Dáil Éireann. This created a fertile climate for Collins’ extremist tactics, allowing him to assassinate more British police and agents without being restrained by moderates.
Following the suppression of Dáil Éireann, the Dáil and the Volunteers (by now popularly known as the IRA) agreed that the IRA should intensify its campaign. With the demise of the DMP in Dublin, the British authorities decided to bring down Mr. William C. Forbes Redmond from Belfast to reorganise the detective force. But his assistant in Dublin Castle was one of Collins’ agents. Redmond was identified and his movements were recorded. On 20th January 1920, Redmond was shot dead by members of the Squad as he returned to his suite in the Standard Hotel in Harcourt Street. According to Squad member, Joe Dolan: “We knew he had a bullet-proof waistcoat, so we shot him in the head.”
Following Redmond’s death, his own undercover detectives pulled out and returned to Belfast, and thereafter ‘G’ Division “ceased to affect the situation”, according to British military intelligence. By the following month, a Secret Service Branch of the RIC no longer existed.
It may be wondered how Collins and his intelligence officers went about seemingly unhindered during this time. The remaining DMP men were generally too afraid to go after Collins, even though many of them were able to identify him. The twin evils of spies and raids remained however. Many of Collins’ office and hiding places, dotted throughout Dublin city, were turned over during the War of Independence. He usually got forewarning from one of his agents and was able to be elsewhere. It also helped when one of his ‘friendly’ detectives was leading the raiding party. In November 1919 Collins’ financial offices on Harcourt Street were raided. Nothing important was discovered because the detective in charge of the search simply didn’t bother looking. What he actually did was: “I went upstairs and counted the roses on the wallpaper until the raid was over.”
The Squad was officially established at 46 Rutland Square on the 19 September 1919. Though by the time it had been in operation for two months and had already carried out two killings. Members were paid £4.10s per week. The first four members were: Michael McDonnell, Ben Barrett, Paddy Daly, (he became a major-general in the National Army), Sean Doyle, Joe Leonard (came right behind Daly in the chain of command), other original members were: James Conroy, Jim McGuinness, Jimmy Slattery (a Clareman with one hand, after being injured in the Custom House fire) William “Billy” Stapleton (Dublin), all added to the original nine after a few months to form the Twelve Apostles (a name first applied, decisively by Austin Stack) were; Vinny Byrne, Tom Kehoe (from Wicklow, later killed in the Civil War), Mick O’Reilly.
Others were added in 1920 and thereafter and were chosen for jobs as needed. Not all did many jobs for Collins, and many were members of various Dublin units who were picked by Collins to assist the regular Squad members; this was particulary true on Bloody Sunday. The other members were: Frank Bolster, Ned Breslin, Ben Byrne, Charlie Byrne (Dublin, called The Count because of his cheerful mien in all situations), Eddie Byrne, Sean Caffrey, Paddy Colgan, (Kildare), James Connolly, Jim Conway (the one-man column), Andy Cooney, Tom Cullen (a teetotaler), Charlie Dalton, Jim Dempsey (Dublin, ex-IRB man who fought in the Rising) Joe Dolan, (Dublin, always armed with a .45 and wore a British army badge on his lapel), Joe Dowling, Pat Drury, John Dunne, Tom Ennis, Paddy Flangan (the eldest member of the Squad), Paddy Griffin, Jack Hanlon, Sean Kavanagh (Dublin and later a prison governor), Ned Kelliher (Dublin), Mick Kennedy, Paddy Kennedy (Tipperary), Martin Lavan, Paddy Lawson, Seán Lemass, (the future Taoiseach), Pat McCrae, (a great driver), Pat McKeon, Peader McMahon, (later Chief of Staff of the Free State Army), Diarmuid O’Hegarty, (Cork, Director of Organisation of the Volunteers), Bob O’Neill, (Clare), Albert Rutherford, Frank Saurin (Dublin, known as the best dressed Volunteer), Frank Teeling,
Liam Tobin, George White, Johnny Wilson.
Three spies came close to getting Collins caught at this time. One was a pretend Marxist sympathiser who Forbes Redmond was using to get to Collins, but once Redmond revealed the spies true intentions in Dublin Castle, word got out to Collins who promptly dealt with the spy. Another was a former Irish POW from Germany in World War I, who double-crossed Collins to get money from the British police. The Cork Volunteers executed him. The third spy offered to buy arms for Collins, but his true purpose was discovered, and he was shot dead by the Squad in broad daylight.
Early 1920 saw several more successes for Collins’ intelligence network. Collins had established a system of meeting his various agents regularly at a house in Clontarf. The keys to police and official cipher codes were ascertained, and over time a system was developed to decode official British police and military messages. A clerk in the RIC fed Collins with information and codes from the RIC headquarters, as did an RIC Sergeant stationed in Belfast. One of his agents managed to get into the British Secret Service, and was able to introduce some of Collins’ intelligence officers to Secret Service men. The Resident Magistrate who had opened a much publicised inquiry into Sinn Fein funds was dragged from a tram and killed on March 26th. On April 3rd, tax offices throughout the country were fire bombed, on Collins’ suggestion, to disrupt the British tax collecting apparatus. By this time, IRA units in various parts of Ireland were shooting policemen. In one day, 350 unoccupied RIC barracks were burned down. Resignations in the police force were running at more than 200 a month at the start of 1920. The IRA appeared to be succeeding in taking over the country. But Britain would fight back.
Image | [L to R] Michael McDonnell, Tom Keogh, Vinny Byrne, Paddy Daly and Jim Slattery | Source: generalmichaelcollins.com
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